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Changing family dynamics and in-work benefits 
ABSTRACT 
Internationally, in-work benefits (IWBs) are widely adopted as a measure to assist parents 
transitioning to work and to ‘make work pay’ for low-income families. The family income 
supplement (FIS) is an Irish IWB, introduced at a time of rapid societal change. 
This article shows how changing family dynamics, and a shift in policy focus towards a ‘work-first’ 
approach, challenged the original values underlying FIS. We discuss FIS in the context of changes to 
family life and social policy. We then outline the results of ten interviews with experts using three 
themes: work-first approach; child poverty and encouraging care. 
Our analysis shows that policymakers faced new challenges to provide an income support for children 
while also promoting full-time labour participation. FIS continues to support working families, but in 
a manner that creates contradictions for the contemporary ‘work-first’ approach. It is necessary to re-
examine FIS in relation to its wider policy context and to address requirements for caring.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This article demonstrates how changing family dynamics and a shift in policy focus towards a ‘work-
first’ approach countered the original values of FIS, Ireland’s In-Work Benefit (IWB), creating 
challenges for policymakers seeking to provide a child income support (CIS), while also promoting 
full-time paid employment. Since the introduction of FIS, Ireland’s policy regime has moved away 
from supporting breadwinner families to promoting an ‘adult-worker’ model’.  However, experiences 
of implementing FIS reveal the contradictions associated with this change in the absence of attention 
to implications for the division of unpaid family labour, including caring responsibilities (Daly, 2011).  
In a recent analysis, McCashin (2019:193) described developments in Irish CIS policy as ‘a stable set 
of provisions in a changing context, such that the changed context undermines the capacity of the 
provisions to meet their underlying goals.’  He argued that policy makers were constrained over time 
in their efforts to adapt the male breadwinner model, both by their own views and by a distinctive 
legal and constitutional legacy (McCashin 2019: 168).  This article adds to McCashin’s analysis by 
offering a first-hand description of how one of Ireland’s CIS payments - FIS has altered over time in 
the context of changing family dynamics and policy priorities. Based on qualitative, semi-structured 
interviews with key informants, we show that policymakers now see FIS primarily as an incentive for 
parents to transition into full-time employment. However, their reflections reveal the extent to which 
this creates new difficulties for meeting FIS’s dual role as a child income support. 
The article begins with an overview of international research on IWBs, placing them in the context of 
the transition towards a social investment state.  This is followed by a detailed analytical discussion of 
FIS, showing how it has altered alongside changing family dynamics and social policy imperatives in 
Ireland.  We then present our analysis of interviews with key informants, carried out as part of a larger 
study on participant experiences of FIS (Gray and Rooney, 2018). We conclude with a discussion of 
our findings and suggest some implications. 
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OVERVIEW OF IN-WORK BENEFITS 
IWBs are policy measures, introduced in many countries which seek to reduce poverty alongside 
incentivising employment (Immervoll and Pearson, 2009). Many IWBs and tax credit systems 
subsidize the wages of low-income workers and particularly target mothers (Blundell et al, 2016). 
Research explores the responsiveness of women to employment incentives and the importance of 
family situation (Chzhen and Middleton, 2007; Adam and Browne, 2010; Akgündüz and Plantenga, 
2011).  Blundell et al (2016) find that tax credits increase labour supply of mothers but decrease that 
of married mothers. Reforms to UK IWBs strengthen the incentive for couples with children to have 
one earner, and weaken incentives for dual-earner households (Adam and Browne, 2010). Moreover, 
Chzhen and Middleton (2007) affirm that working tax credits act as incentives for working partnered 
mothers to reduce hours. 
Social investment emerged from challenges to neo-liberalism and a desire to ensure that populations 
can deal with post Fordist issues such as employment insecurity and precarious employment (Jenson 
and Saint Martin, 2003; Jenson, 2009 Morel et al, 2012). The European Commission (EC) describes 
social investment as investing in people and maintains that it involves policies designed to strengthen 
peoples’ skills, as well as to support them to participate fully in employment (EC, nd). This includes 
key policy areas such as education, quality child care, healthcare, training and job searching. The EC 
social investment package aims to encourage countries to implement social policies that contribute to 
economic growth, protect people from poverty and stabilise economies (Bouget et al, 2015). It states 
that women benefit through equal and better labour market opportunities. Recently Ireland has 
adopted elements of social investment, but Irish policies are primarily focused on activation of 
unemployed people, with small moves in early childhood education (Daly, 2015). Transitioning to a 
social investment state means that there is an emphasis on inclusion, plus labour market participation 
favouring the formation of two earner households (Ferrera, 2009). 
A work-first policy approach considers caring as a barrier to employment in many countries (Ingold 
and Etherington, 2013). Parents are expected to work but policy often does not consider their 
preferred care choice and childcare prices also affect mothers’ involvement in employment 
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(Akgündüz and Plantenga, 2011; Ingold and Etherington, 2013). Therefore, caring restricts 
opportunities for paid work (Shildrick et al 2012). Under social investment perspectives, family 
policies are framed as employment policies and lead to a focus on reducing family constraints towards 
labour force participation (Saraceno, 2015). Despite Irish policy moves towards social investment, 
early childcare education remains expensive and has not embraced a work-life balance approach 
(Daly, 2015). Focusing on paid work devalues other elements of our lives including leisure or social 
participation (Saraceno, 2015).  Thus it appears that social investment approaches prioritize the right 
to work over any right to care.  
OVERVIEW OF FIS AND CHANGES TO FIS 
Changes to FIS and Family life 
FIS is an Irish income tested IWB and CIS introduced in 1984, originally intended as a temporary 
measure to provide relief to low-income families after food subsidies ceased (DSP 2010, 40).  Over 
time, FIS has been modified alongside changes in family dynamics. FIS defines ‘family’ as any 
household with at least one parent or guardian and a child (Citizens information, 2017a). However, 
since its introduction, there have been substantial changes in household composition and work-family 
arrangements. These have been accompanied by legislative changes relating to the status of women 
and children, marriage, civil partnership and child welfare.  
 Many European Union (EU) states, including Ireland, have developed policies promoting 
female labour force participation (Daly, 2011) which can lead to de-familisation of care (Lewis, 2001; 
Coakley, 2005). Although there was a shift towards an adult-worker model, Irish policies relating to 
caring have not fully adapted to family changes, despite some moves in this direction, including Early 
Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) schemes. ECCE offers free childcare for fixed hours over a 
set period of weeks for children aged over three and less than five and a half (Citizen Information, 
2017 b). However, access to childcare outside of ECCE hours and before or after free pre-school 
years depends on parents’ income (Byrne and O’Toole, 2012). Failure to fully address caring by Irish 
policy has implications for FIS. In 2018, FIS was renamed the Working Family Payment (WFP), 
which aims to make employment monetarily worthwhile and reduce child poverty (Doherty, 2017). 
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However, critics maintain that it is merely a name change without addressing issues that prevent 
worthwhile employment, such as precarious working, poverty traps, unaffordable childcare, and low 
pay (Brady, 2017; O’Dea, 2017). Sections below highlight how FIS was introduced during periods of 
change to Irish family dynamics and provide an overview of subsequent trends in family life including 
separation, divorce, cohabitation, lone-parenthood, increasing female employment and immigration 
(Daly 2004, Gray, Geraghty and Ralph, 2016). 
Early stages 1984-1989 
Irish social welfare policy traditionally favoured a full-time homemaker role for mothers and provider 
duty for fathers (Daly and Clavero, 2002).  It sought to support traditional family structures founded 
on marriage consisting of male-female partnerships with children. From the 1970s, there was a change 
in emphasis towards promoting the rights and welfare of individuals within families, rather than on 
supporting the family as a hierarchical, corporate unit (Fahey 1998; Fahey and Nixon, 2012).  For 
example, an ‘unmarried mother’s allowance’ was introduced in 1973, and payment of children’s 
allowances directly to mothers was introduced in 1974. Yet aspects of a ‘male breadwinner’ model 
remained in Irish family policy.  
By 1984, Ireland experienced pressure from EU social security equality directives and feminist groups 
to transition from patriarchal values that had dominated social welfare policy development (O’Connor 
and Murphy, 2008).  Irish unemployment was high in the 1980s and spending on social welfare 
increased dramatically as a proportion of GDP (Peillon, 2001). FIS was first introduced to help 
alleviate child poverty, support low-income families and because wages of low-income workers 
converged with those of social welfare recipients (Commission for Social Welfare, 1986: 300). 
However, its original structure tended to reinforce the breadwinner family because it was offered to 
one adult per-household, working a minimum of 30 hours per-week. This favoured two-parent 
families with a division of labour between work and caring, in contrast to lone-parents with limited 
part-time work availability due to caring requirements. As we will see, FIS increasingly became an 
important source of support for growing numbers of one-parent families as Irish family patterns 
changed. 
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The 1980s witnessed a rapid decline in birth and fertility rates (Punch 2007; Canavan 2012), 
accompanied by a steep increase in the proportion of births outside marriage (Fahey 2016, p. 60).   
Female employment grew by 54.6 per cent compared to 10.2 per cent for men from 1971-91 (Walsh, 
1993), which was mostly attributable to married women entering the workforce (Fahey et al. 2012).  
FIS policy responded to these changes in 1989, by enabling a spouse’s income to contribute towards 
eligibility, rendering it possible to combine couples’ hours to meet FIS criteria. The minimum hours 
for eligibility were reduced from 30 to 24 in 1987 and again in 1989 to 20 hours per-week. Figure 1 
demonstrates how the reduction in minimum hours for FIS coincided with increasing female 
employment.  (The increased per child payment to large families in 2006, is discussed in Section 4.4, 
below).  
Figure 1:  Irish female employment rates (Eurostat, 2015, Punch 2007, CSO, 2015 a).   
 
1990-2005 
In the 1990s, European policy discourse shifted in favour of an ‘adult-worker model’ in the context of 
continuing individualisation and a focus on the employment of mothers (Coakley, 2005). The EU and 
Organisation for Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) encouraged their members to 
move from passive to active labour strategies to encourage employment amongst social welfare 
recipients (Whitworth and Griggs, 2013; Bengtsson, 2014). Ireland was slow to move in this direction 
fortnight 
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and we argue that attempts to adapt FIS at this juncture exposed paradoxes of individualisation within 
the adult-worker model, in the absence of any plans to address caring. 
The literature contends that a reluctance to adopt active strategies was partly due to economic 
conditions and later documents a movement towards a ‘mother worker regime’ where part-time work 
is facilitated alongside domestic caring duties (Murphy, 2010, 2014). When making decisions 
regarding work, economic costs are secondary concerns to moral criteria about what is socially right 
(Duncan and Edwards, 1997).  Mothers’ decisions are often based upon childcare obligations and 
secondly by employment opportunities (Coakley, 2005). Policy has also shifted to promote one parent 
workforce engagement. In 1996 0.35% of adults over 15 were divorced and this increased to 2.77% in 
2016. In 1996 2.82% of adults aged over 15 were separated whereas 3.15% were separated in 2016 
(CSO, 2018). Fewer than 10 per cent of births were outside marriage when FIS was introduced; 
however, in 1997, 41 per cent of non-marital births were to lone-parents (Fahey and Russel, 2001). In 
2001, 12 per cent of children aged less than 15 lived with a lone-parent (Fahey and Russell, 2001). 
Nonetheless, exercising policy elements of both individualisation and familization through the adult-
worker model is not unique to Ireland. Daly (2011) demonstrates the coexistence of both policy types 
across Western Europe, with individualisation policies that include minimised supports to lone 
mothers that target activation strategies alongside financial payments to families. She suggests that 
countries engage in a dual-earner gender specialized family model of policy reform rather than an 
adult-worker model.  
Irish employment rose considerably in the late 1990s and there was a growth in divisions 
between work-poor and work-rich households due to domestic structural changes in education, 
economy and employment (Singley and Callister 2003; Logue and Callan, 2016). Dual-income and 
work-rich households increased, with all working age family members in paid employment, and such 
households were likely to have high education levels (Gregg and Wadsworth, 1994; Russell et al. 
2004; OECD, 2011). This contrasts with lone parents who tend to have lower levels of education plus 
a higher risk of unemployment (Watson et al. 2011). Furthermore, Irish childcare is not adequately 
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state-subsided encouraging lone parents to remain at home to raise children, and many households 
engage in family leave or exit employment (Coakley, 2005, CPA, 2005, Canavan, 2012).   
Female labour force participation grew from 35.7per cent in 1990 to 51.9 per cent in 2005 and 
many engaged in part-time employment (OECD, 2015). In 1990, 21.2 per cent of employees were 
part-time female workers, growing to 34.6per cent in 2005 (OECD, 2014c). A majority of educated 
women and those without pre-school children changed from full-time domiciliary roles to 
employment, yet state supports to encourage both parents into employment were lower than other EU 
countries (McGinnity and Russell, 2008). FIS responded to dual-earner household increases and 
challenges associated with caring roles by reducing minimum eligibility work hours from 20 hours 
per week to 38 per fortnight (Figure 2).  These changes responded to both the movement towards a 
dual-earner regime and increases in lone-parents working part-time.  However, this was not an 
incentive for mothers to work longer hours, nor did it address the cost of childcare. This policy change 
is complex and contradictory in nature as FIS attempted to address both the needs of low-income, and 
lower educated families while also trying to address requirements of lone-parents.  
Changes to FIS minimum work hours represented a response by policymakers to growing 
female employment participation and women’s tendency to work part-time in the 1990s. They 
appeared to support an adaptive breadwinner model by promoting part-time employment.  
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Figure 2: Percentage full-time and part-time Irish female labour-force participation 1990-2005 
(OECD 2014a; OECD 2014c) 
 
 Terminology used to describe social policy gradually changed. The 1970s means tested 
allowance for un-married mothers became the 1990s Lone-Parent Allowance and the One-Parent 
Family Payment (OFP) in 1997. However, in 2005 the employment rate for lone-parents in Ireland 
was just 44.9 per cent compared to the OECD average of 70.6 per cent (Hannan et al. 2013). Irish 
cohabitation tripled from 1994-2002 and was often a temporary state more common amongst urban 
younger childless couples (Halpin, and O' Donoghue 2005; CSO, 2012; Canavan, 2012; Hannan and 
Halpin 2014). In a movement away from its original principles favouring traditional family types, 
cohabitating couples became eligible to receive FIS in 1991. There were also decreases in percentages 
of married FIS recipients and increases in single parent beneficiaries (DSP, 2017; Figure 3). In 1990, 
95.4 per cent of recipients were married and 1.9 per cent were single whereas, in 2002, 47.4 per cent 
of recipients were married and 34.8 per cent were single (Figure 3).  
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Figure 3: Percentage of single and married FIS recipients (DSP, 2017) 
 
2005-present 
Ireland witnessed substantial spending on active labour market strategies during the Celtic Tiger era. 
However, they were not considered well implemented or monitored and Social Partnership 
negotiations led to increases in welfare payments (Martin, 2015). Thus, when the Irish economy 
crashed after 2008, the government was required to implement strictly monitored labour-market 
activation strategies by The Troika (Murphy, 2016). Although there was discourse regarding job 
searching support in the 1980s and a job search programme was introduced compared to activation 
strategies after 2008, it contained supportive conditionality with poor implementation (Bond, 1988; 
Murphy, 2010). Murphy (2010) charts how employment policy discourse in Ireland moved from 
labour market activation in 1980s to more passive strategies alongside strong economic growth during 
the 1990s and mid-2000s, to vigorous activation strategies post 2008 (Figure, 4). 
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Figure 4: Timeline of labour market discourse in Ireland adapted from Murphy (2010). 
Although FIS is not a labour activation policy, a growing emphasis on ‘work-first’ placed a spotlight 
on its role in supporting labour-market participation and assisting in work activation of lone-parents. 
Because of increased awareness of FIS, changes to OFP and an economic recession, the number of 
recipients increased from 11898 in 1996, to 50306 in 2014. Male dominated occupations experienced 
dramatic job losses compared to traditionally female sectors such as health and education in the 
recession (McGinnity et al. 2014). Although numbers of partnered female employees working fewer 
than 30 hours per week dipped from 46.2 per cent to 38.8 per cent in 2013, the percentages of 
partnered men working fewer than 30 hours per week increased from 3.9 per cent in 2006 to 8.6 per 
cent in 2013 (Figure 5). 
Figure 5: Percentage of couples and lone-parents working 1 to 29 hours per week (OECD 2014 b)  
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Adjustments to FIS income thresholds coincided with changes to the employment rates of lone and 
partnered mothers, and reflected the shift in emphasis towards activation (Figure 6). By 2011, 24.5 per 
cent of Irish births were to lone-parents (Hannan, Halpin et al. 2013, figure 6). In 2012, employment 
rates were lowest for lone-parents, cohabiting families and formally married single adults (McGinnity 
et al. 2014). In 2014 the employment rate for lone mothers was 46.2 per cent compared to 63.3 per 
cent for partnered mothers. 
Figure 6: Percentage employment rate for partnered and lone mothers aged 15-64 years with at least 
one child aged under 15 years (CSO, 2014; OECD 2014b; CSO 2015 a, CSO 2015, b)  
 
The Survey on Income and Living Conditions, shows that in 2013, lone-parents (c.60 per cent) had 
the highest basic deprivation levelsi  (Watson, et al. 2016). The cut-off point to receive OFP was 
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1,100 moved in 2014 (Millar and Crosse, 2016). In 2003 38.37% of FIS recipients were one parent 
families, which increased to 49.79% in 2015 (Figure 7).  
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families. For instance, in 2006, 21 per cent of mothers had four or more children and 7.5 per cent had 
more than 5 (Fahey et al, 2012). Per-child FIS payments to large families were increased in 2006 
considering that larger families continued to be at greater risk of poverty. 
Figure 7: Number of one parent and two parent FIS recipients (DSP, 2017)  
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understand the motivations behind policy decisions relating to FIS. Ten semi-structured interviews 
were carried out with informants who had knowledge of IWBs, policy development and research 
(Table 2). Interviews with experts are valuable data collection tools in the study of public policy-
making (Beyers et al, 2014). The primary advantage is that interviews provide more detailed 
information than documentary collection methods alone as they have the potential to uncover ‘the 
contradictions, uncertainties and politics inherent in policy-making’ (Duke 2002, p. 55). By engaging 
with experienced informants working with FIS beneficiaries, the research is grounded in tangible 
evidence from those with knowledge and expertise to consider the evolution of FIS. Informants were 
involved in designing, delivering or implementing FIS and consisted of policy actors, representatives 
of low-income workers and academics. Participants were recruited through snowball sampling. 
Ethical approval was obtained from Maynooth University ethics committee prior to commencing 
fieldwork. Information sheets and consent forms were provided to interviewees with an interview 
topic guide that focused on participant’s background, administration of IWBs, description of FIS, 
integration with other supports, and the meaning of supports to families. This helped to compare 
resultant transcripts and ensured consistency of questions, while allowing flexibility to follow 
emerging leads during interviews (Stevenson, et al, 2007, Table 1).  
Table 1: Examples of interview questions  
Background information:  
 Could you describe your current role?  
 What is your involvement with FIS?  
 Could you describe how FIS was developed?   
Description of FIS:  
 How would you describe FIS?  
 Will you describe the main purposes of FIS?  
 Will you describe the main strengths and weaknesses of FIS?  
 Would you describe how FIS integrates with other means-tested payments or income 
supplements?  
Administration of IWBS 
 Would you discuss how changes to FIS since its introduction in 1986 affect its 
administration/effectiveness or not? 
 Will you describe how changes have affected low-income families?  
Meaning of supports to families:  
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 Will you describe what FIS means to low-income families?  
 In your opinion how can FIS change if necessary? 
 Table 2: Participant descriptions  
Interview number    Role  
1      Researcher 
2      Economist/researcher  
3      Policy officer/organisation representing low-income 
      workers   
4      Policy Officer 
5      Policy Officer  
6      Policy Officer  
7      Policy Manger/organisation representing low-income  
      workers   
8      Policy Officer 
9       Policy Officer 
10       Policy Officer  
 
Analysis of interview transcripts 
Data were generated using audio-recorded interviews and transcribed verbatim. Interviews were 
analysed inductively using thematic framework analysis (Ritchie and Spencer, 1994, 2002).  Within 
this approach, analysis takes place across five stages, namely: identify a thematic analysis framework, 
index, chart and synthesise the data (Furber, 2010). We constructed a thematic framework by coding 
key themes embedded in the transcripts (Iliffe et al, 2013). Transcripts were then further read and 
annotated according to the thematic framework. Links between categories were identified and 
grouped to form a hierarchy of themes and data in previously indexed transcript segments were 
arranged into charts of themes displaying their key characteristics and relationships (Ritchie and 
Lewis, 2008). Results were synthesised and described in a report format (Gray and Rooney, 2018). 
FINDINGS 
Findings are discussed in the sections below where three overarching themes emerged from analysis: 
(1) 'work-first' approach, (2) child poverty and (3) encouraging care. Informants reported that FIS 
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responded to economic and demographic changes by moving away from some of its original goals. 
They noted that the scheme is now accessible to part-time workers in response to increasing numbers 
of female employees and lone-parents. In terms of expenditure FIS was viewed as a small payment in 
comparison to other social welfare schemes and originally many eligible families did not take-up the 
scheme (Callan, O’Neill and O’Donoghue, 1995). In addition, informants felt that take-up of this 
scheme was initially low: “I think that the participation rate for FIS recipients relative to where it 
should have been was low” (Informant 2). They surmised that potential claimants were seemingly 
unaware of its existence. Overall, however, Informants felt that FIS is developing without a clear 
focus and determined that the purpose of FIS has become unclear after years of change: “But there 
have been quite a lot of changes. You know…lowering…changing the hours threshold …I mean as I 
have said it’s grown in terms of expenditure and in terms of numbers but still nobody knows what it is 
actually doing” (Informant 1). Moreover, Informant 8 cautioned that changes to policy often have 
unintended consequences that may affect other social welfare schemes, therefore changes to FIS 
should be given careful consideration: 
I think what happens is when the scheme changes, where the eligibility conditions change, 
often what happens is not what people expected to happen…there can…be unintended 
consequences and then another change has to be made. 
Work-first approach 
Informants reported that language used by FIS policy assumed that it supported male breadwinner 
households: 
The original legislation of 1984…said man and wife, or husband and wife...  But certainly, 
over the years the definition of a couple or family was also included.  It probably said man 
and woman cohabiting until the new legislation last year, which allows for same sex couples 
(Informant 5). 
The report for the Commission on Social Welfare (1986) iii similarly used ‘male breadwinner’ 
language stating that FIS supplements “families where the household head is employed full-time” 
(300).  However, Informant 1 contended that the overarching intention of FIS was as an employment 
incentive: "FIS is seen as being a way of addressing the issue of incentives" and many informants 
focused upon the continuing role of FIS in increasing overall employment participation: "It’s an in-
work benefit for low income families to try and keep them connected to the labour market...it’s a bit 
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like making work pay for low paid workers…families with children" (Informant 2). Although  other 
informants saw an additional role for FIS in incentivising working parents to transition into full-time 
employment: ‘the more fundamental question is should we actually support people who are working 
part-time but should there be conditionality that they have to start to look for more work?’ (Informant 
10). Informant 9 suggested that, rather than reducing the ‘hours threshold,’ employers should be 
required to improve working hours and conditions to encourage full-time employment: “there is an 
onus on employers I think to give people decent hours and provide decent wages. I think to be reduced 
any further it (hours threshold) kind of leads to creating unsustainable employment”. 
Many policymakers subscribed to a ‘work-first’ approach: “At the end of the day we want everyone to 
be in full employment” (Informant 5). Informant 4 described a work-first approach as important 
socially thus encouraging positive mental health: 
 It has a huge social aspect to it as well and that encourages people to do better for themselves.  
 I think that is really positive.  It is always good to see somebody getting into work and 
 doing what they need to do instead of sitting at home. 
Furthermore, Informant 8 believed that FIS should encourage in-work approaches through positive 
conditionality measures for up skilling: 
There should be...I think in tandem with employers particularly employers who use FIS quite 
a lot, I think I’d like to see some sort of training or educational element offered to FIS 
recipients, not as a stick - as a carrot.  
 
Child poverty 
From its inception FIS had a dual role as an income and child support that sought to reduce child 
poverty. Interviewee 2 described it as a way of connecting families to the labour force and believed 
that it retained its purpose as payment to reduce child poverty: “the benefits are predominantly 
intended for the child rather than for the parents” while Informant 6 believed that FIS can assist 
parents to meet the final costs of child rearing:  "It helps to pay for the additional costs of working, 
child care and travel". They noted that child rearing costs change according to children’s' life stages 
and suggested some scope to carry out research into FIS effectiveness at different time points: 
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 Because then you have to throw in childcare costs which surely...would wipe out  the gains in 
 working. So there is kind of an interesting balance there as to when FIS does and doesn’t 
 work for families...It would be interesting to see when (FIS recipients) started…and to align 
 that up then to the ages of children.  
Informant 3 also found that low-income workers faced challenges throughout a child's lifespan that 
may necessitate that parents spend more time at home: "They might have a teenager now... 
They...don’t need childcare but they might be going through difficulties in school, they might have 
mental health difficulties and parents were saying I actually can’t leave them alone now". Others 
asserted that when it was introduced FIS helped workers’ overall recovery from a persistent 1980s 
recession as it was not previously possible to receive multiple social welfare payments: 
The big thing at the time it was introduced was it wasn’t possible to actually be in receipt of 
FIS and another welfare payment because if you were working 38 hours a week even in 
relatively low-income employment you actually couldn’t qualify for another means tested 
payment…even for…one parent family payment  (Informant 10).  
However, other comments suggest that informants experienced a contradiction between FIS’s impact 
in reducing child poverty and its work-first approach. Informant 2 suggested the benefit of making 
FIS available to all low income workers to separate its role as a work benefit and its function as a CIS: 
"Bring in an in work benefit which would then target low income workers irrespective of whether they 
had children". In this model, child benefit is means- tested and a universal credit system exists for all 
low-income workers. However, he felt this system would perhaps dis-incentivise lone-parents and 
large families. 
Reflecting on potential policy changes, informants discussed unintended consequences when changes 
interact with other schemes. In this context, Informant 7 noted how changes to OFP had knock-on 
effects on FIS stating that OFP recipients were shocked at weekly payment reductions when their 
youngest child reached 7 years: "I don't think that is particularly incentivising people to stay in work.  
And anecdotally...we have heard of a number of parents who have said they had to leave work as a 
result of the reforms".   Whereas, informant 3 was against removing the objective of supporting 
children: "The combination of FIS being an in-work income support and a CIS at the same time…we 
think it is important that it does both...if you separate the two out, we'd be concerned that the payment 
wouldn’t be as generous”. 
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Encouraging care 
Policymakers thus suggest contradictions between the FIS scheme’s original intention as a work 
incentive and its evolved role in enabling parents to care for children or other family members. 
Informants maintained that there is a focus on financial models in existing research indicating a need 
for qualitative research regarding linkages between FIS as a work incentive and how it responds to 
caring responsibilities: 
 None of these (existing research reports) are based on people or asked them …are you  
 invested in your job.....you know is it an issue of travel?...childcare? Or the money you get? 
 Um…whatever you know…nobody has actually gone out and talked to people (Informant 1).  
Many Informants queried whether making FIS available to part-time workers was a disincentive to 
seeking fulltime work hours given requirements of caring. They felt that there was a conflict between 
FIS as a work-first policy and the cost of childcare:  "It would have to be very financially beneficial 
for a person to increase their hours because otherwise they could spend more time with their children 
at home" (Informant 4). Moreover, Informant 10 felt the purpose of FIS was now unclear and was 
concerned that entry of part-time workers goes against the ethos of work-first strategies: 
A reasonably large proportion of the people on FIS have care responsibilities, which are 
effectively going to prevent them working full-time. Then what is FIS then? …. I’m not sure 
what it is… Has FIS become for those people actually a kind of a proxy carer’s payment?  
However, others deemed the work-first approach as unfair to lone-parents and suggested that the 
ability to work part-time and care for family members is particularly important to this group: “for a 
lone-parent the main barriers are their parenting responsibilities, balancing parenting and work, 
access to affordable child care that is a huge issue” (Informant 7). They maintained that the ‘hour 
threshold’ was too high for lone-parents struggling to balance work and caring responsibilities: “they 
might find it hard to meet the 38 hours a fortnight condition, but also if their hours drop at certain 
times in the year then they lose entitlement to FIS” (Informant 7). In addition, Informant 3 considered 
that it was vital to support lone parents: "your wages don’t take into account whether you are a single 
person or a single person with children. So if the social welfare system doesn’t take that into account, 
people aren’t going to be able to make ends meet in a job". She believed that many employed lone-
parents experienced income cuts due to changes to OFP and FIS in contrast to their stated aim of 
incentivising work: 
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And how was that experience for them? To suddenly realise you were €80 a week down as a 
result of reforms even though you are doing everything the government say they want to you 
to do which is to go out and to work and to bring in an income. 
However, in terms of dual income families, others maintained that current ‘hours thresholds’ enabled 
these households to split their hours to meet FIS requirements and address caring responsibilities 
more easily: 
Couples have the same childcare responsibilities that a lone-parent has but the hours ‘work 
threshold’ is the same. So that two people only have to work 19 hours between them. 
Whereas the lone-parent only has to work 19 on their own. So it's slightly unfair if you've 
small children (Informant 8). 
He considered that FIS was a favourable payment for dual-income households with a large number of 
children: “I think perhaps it does favour people with larger numbers of children and it was designed 
that way in the beginning”. Informant 8 noted that policy discourse is often critical of high income 
thresholds in large families and that it advocates an option to increase thresholds for one or two 
children families only. In addition, others emphasised FIS favouring of parents of large families and 
proposed an income limit reintroduction as many of these have large salaries: "(FIS) is based on the 
number of children that you have… if you have six or seven children the limit is about 
€1,000s…maybe a limit could be brought in so you could get up to as much as your earnings" 
(Informant 6).  
This strategy originated in a NESC (1979) report which observed that many large families were 
financially disadvantaged in comparison to childless households. Informant 2 noted increases in the 
number of men experiencing reduced incomes in the recent recession and questioned whether FIS 
creates a disincentive for men to return to work or increase their hours in dual-income settings. He 
suspected that childcare might prevent partnered workers from increasing their hours regardless of 
gender: 
 Female employment has been slow...at recovering…but the recovery it has been a lot 
 slower in the construction sector and they are predominantly males.... that draws  up an 
 interesting policy question ...of whether there may be a benefit trap for those males to go back 
 to work…because of the fact that it is their income rise that would trigger the reduction of 
 payment. That’s an interesting policy question for future...the provision of childcare is also 
 an element of the impediments that might be there for some males to go back to work. 
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DISCUSSION 
International literature shows that IWBs focus on encouraging low-income mothers to enter 
employment and increase their working hours (Blundell, 2016). It appears that IWBs also dis-
incentivize second earners to increase employment (Chzhen and Middleton, 2007; Adam and Browne, 
2010; Blundell, 2016), and work-first approaches prioritise the right to work over the right to care 
(Akgündüz and Pantenga, 2011; Ingold and Etherington, 2013). This article sheds light on how IWBs 
tend to create this pattern in an Irish context and shows how changing family dynamics with a shift in 
policy focus towards a ‘work-first’ approach challenge the original values underlying FIS. This was 
originally a work incentive to ensure financial gain in low paid employment rather than receiving 
social welfare payments and was also used as an instrument to fight child poverty (Commission for 
Social Welfare, 1986; DSP, 2010). Evidence from interviews in this current study, consistent with 
documentary evidence provided elsewhere (McCashin 2019; Gray and Rooney, 2018) show that 
policymakers believe the initial aim of FIS was to encourage employment based on a 'male 
breadwinner' model. However, policymakers are under pressure to make changes due both to 
changing family structures and shifts in policy priorities. Our study shows that even as policymakers 
try to adapt to changes and shift towards supporting children rather than family types, adjustments to 
FIS continue to have the unintended consequence of favouring a single income household earning 
strategy, given families’ responsibilities for caring. This article documents how policymakers 
reflected on these challenges. 
 Ireland has been moving away from a breadwinner model of labour market participant to a 
dual-earner model. This study's findings concur with previous research which shows that Ireland has 
adopted elements of a social investment approach by focusing on the labour activation of parents 
(Daly, 2015; EU Commission, nd). Interviews with policy makers and advocacy groups in this study 
demonstrate that there is a strong emphasis now on work-first strategies and FIS is viewed primarily 
as an incentive to assist parents in transitioning into full-time employment. Policymakers argued that 
FIS should encourage both parents to work full-time in dual income households. However, experts 
also maintain that employers should be obliged to improve working conditions and wages for 
employees. 
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 This article has outlined changes in family dynamics relating to the recent ‘great’ recession, 
notably job loss in traditionally male dominated sectors that led to an increase in part-time working 
for men (McGinnity et al, 2014) and an increase in the number of lone parents with high levels of 
deprivation (Watson et al, 2016). Our expert informants believed that FIS helped people to recover 
from recession, in line with its second primary aim of fighting child poverty. Participants argued that 
it helped pay for additional costs of working, such as childcare or travel. However, other research 
shows that when making decisions regarding work, economic concerns are often secondary to parents 
versus issues of child care or spending time with their children (Duncan and Edwards, 1997; Coakley, 
2015) and interviews with FIS recipients carried out as part of the wider study confirm this for the 
Irish case (Gray and Rooney, 2018). Although our expert informants believe that FIS helps with the 
financial cost of child caring, they also noted that lone-parents face particular challenges balancing 
meeting the hours threshold against the need to spend time with their families. Future research could 
examine how FIS contributes financially to families when their children are at different life stages.  
 Despite maintaining its role as a work incentive, FIS has changed paradoxically in the context 
of policy failure to take account of households with different work-life strategies and family 
formations.  Part-time worker eligibility is contrary to its original aims and the views of many 
policymakers who argue that full-time employment should be promoted under the FIS scheme. 
Policymakers commented that this aspect of FIS goes against its 'work first' ethos in failing to 
encourage parents to increase their hours. Research suggests that childcare and early childhood 
education in Ireland is not adequately subsidised by the state (Canavan, 2012; Daly, 2015).  
Contrasting opinions are evident in this present study, where many informants feel that it is important 
for parents to balance care and work. A lack of affordable childcare adds to the complexity of 
encouraging parents to increase work hours.  
CONCLUSION 
This article helps to provide important context for understanding why IWBs tend to assist single 
earner rather than dual-income households. It has provided an analytical context for understanding 
how this pattern persists even in the context of a policy shift towards adult-worker model policies. 
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Our study demonstrates that even as policymakers try to adapt to changes and shift towards 
supporting children rather than family types, the scheme paradoxically continues to favour this 
household earning strategy in the absence of wider supports for family caring responsibilities. 
FIS was introduced to support working families at a time when family and household dynamics were 
beginning to change in Ireland. This article highlighted how changes to family formation and a 
movement in policy focus towards a work-first approach challenged the original values underlying 
FIS. It has been adapted to some extent to these changes, but has morphed in paradoxical ways in the 
context of policy failures to take account of divergent family household work strategies. One of the 
original aims of FIS policy was to encourage full-time working. However, the eligibility of part-time 
workers goes against this ethos. This policy may unintentionally favour the ‘adaptive’ form of dual-
income households in which one parent works part-time to facilitate care for family members. It may 
also disadvantage lone-parents who wish to work less than 19 hours per-week to care for family. 
Nonetheless, it continues to be a vital support for many working families. This is in ways that appear 
contrary to contemporary policy emphasis on activation towards full-time employment and that 
disadvantage some family-work strategies.  
The evolution of changes to Ireland’s IWB opens a critical window on the contradictions 
inherent in the recent move towards a social investment model with a ‘work first’ agenda, in the 
context of the ‘innate conservatism’ of the Irish social security system (Murphy 2012). Irish policy 
makers face considerable challenges in attempting to reform supports to working families that meet 
requirements for caring across the family life course. For instance, there is a need to provide high 
quality early childhood education while acknowledging parents’ preferences to prioritize family based 
care, without disadvantaging lone-parents. In tandem with policy change it is necessary to recognise 
the responsibility of employers to provide adequate working conditions that help to encourage parents 
to remain in full-time employment. Finally, there is a need for policymakers to agree on the modern 
day purpose of FIS in order to reach its full potential as a family support. 
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i  Basic deprivation levels refer to lacking in four or more of the eleven basic goods and services identified in 
the national basic deprivation measure, covering an inability to afford adequate food, clothing, heating, 
replacing worn furniture and basic social engagement (Watson et al, 2016, 26). 
ii Grant number: RFPS/2015/26 
 
iii The Report on Commission on Social Welfare reviewed Irish social policy between 1983 to 1986 and heavily 
influences Irish social security policy between 1987 to 1994. 
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